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The commentaries on my target article on animal sentience and the precautionary principle
(Birch 2017a) by Elwood and Seth & Dienes — not yet published at the time of my of
Response to the first round of commentaries (Birch 2017b) — are excellent contributions to
the debate. Meanwhile, in another journal, a substantial critique of some of my arguments,
and of the evidence regarding sentience in decapods, has recently appeared (Diggles 2018).
Here I respond to Elwood, Seth & Dienes as well as Diggles. I discuss the link between
avoidance learning and sentience, the relevance of the clash between frequentist and
Bayesian statistics, the risks to decapod welfare in aquaculture, and the broader concerns
one may have about a “precautionary” approach to protecting invertebrates.
1. Which forms of avoidance learning are sentience-linked?
Elwood raises several interesting issues. What particularly caught my attention is his
distinction between swift and slow avoidance learning: Whole crabs learn fast to avoid
electric shocks (sometimes requiring only two trials), whereas decerebrate crabs learn
slowly (requiring over 5,000 trials), leading Elwood to suggest, plausibly, that the former
ability is a credible positive indicator of sentience whereas the latter is not.
One way or another, we do, I think, have to draw a distinction between forms of
avoidance learning that are credible indicators of sentience and forms that are not. Nematode
worms can do avoidance learning with 302 neurons (Ha et al. 2010). We can’t be sure they
are not sentient (and I have never claimed they are not). But the possibility of avoidance
learning in extremely simple nervous systems should give us pause on the question of
whether avoidance learning is a credible indicator of sentience.
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The drawback of insisting on fast avoidance learning is of course that speed is a matter
of degree, and it is not clear there is any way to draw a non-arbitrary line between forms of
learning on the basis of speed alone. The difference is quantitative, but the difference
between the presence or absence of sentience is qualitative (even if sentience, when present,
can vary along multiple dimensions, as suggested in Birch 2018). Perhaps a better approach
is to look for qualitative differences between forms of avoidance learning.
Bronfman et al. (2016) distinguish between limited and unlimited associative learning,
taking only the latter to be a credible indicator of sentience. What is “unlimited" associative
learning? It is associative learning in which compound stimuli (consisting of packages of
colours, shapes, textures, smells, etc.) can be associated with complex action sequences and
with other compound stimuli, with the possibility of higher-order conditioning. This is
contrasted with “limited” associative learning, in which the conditioned stimulus must be
simple (a single sensory stimulus) and only first-order conditioning is possible. Learning in
nematodes and decerebrate crabs may well be “limited” in this sense, whereas learning in
healthy arthropods, cephalopods and vertebrates seems substantially less limited.
Another proposal is that of Allen (2004, 2013), who highlights the special importance
of trace conditioning as opposed to other kinds of conditioning. Trace conditioning is a
variant of classical conditioning in which the conditioned and unconditioned stimuli are
separated in time: for example, a light flash might be followed, a few seconds later, by a blast
of air. Trace conditioning requires an ability to keep track of temporal relations between
stimuli. This “keeping track” seems to involve consciousness in humans, even though it could
(of course) conceivably occur without it (Clark and Squire 1998). I have not come across any
studies showing trace conditioning in crabs, but it has been found in rainbow trout
(Nordgreen et al. 2010), fruit flies (Dylla et al. 2013) and honey bees (Szyszka et al. 2011).
I suspect the distinction between whole-organism and part-specific behaviours is also
relevant. Learned leg withdrawal in the shore crab may be possible without centralized
processing, but it is not a behaviour of the whole organism. By contrast, choosing a shelter
involves the whole organism and requires centralized processing. There is a suggestive
analogy with blindsight in humans: blindsight patients can use unconscious information to
guide the movement of a limb, but they can’t use this information to guide strategic, wholeorganism behaviour (Dretske 2006).
These considerations suggest that avoidance learning, while not a credible indicator
of sentience by itself, may become a credible indicator in the presence of one or more
additional features. But this matter is far from settled, and I invite further discussion on the
question of which forms of avoidance learning are indicative of sentience and why.
2. Bayes factors or significance levels?
Seth & Dienes connect the Animal Sentience Precautionary Principle (ASPP) to the longrunning clash between frequentist and Bayesian approaches in statistics. This leads to an
interesting question: does a framework for converting scientific evidence into a policy
response, such as ASPP, really need to make any commitments at all regarding statistical
methodology?
My proposals included a requirement of “statistically significant evidence” of a
credible indicator of sentience but deliberately avoided any specification of the required
significance level, since this should be fixed by normal scientific standards. For Seth & Dienes,
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this minimal requirement is already regrettable, because “statistical significance” implies a
commitment to frequentist rather than Bayesian statistics.
Why did I include this requirement? Simply because merely requiring “evidence”
would be too weak. It would risk allowing that, if an experiment yields merely anecdotal or
extremely weak evidence of a credible indicator, that is already enough to satisfy BAR. So, I
needed to say something to characterise experimental evidence that is substantial and
deserves to be taken seriously by policymakers, and it was natural here to reach for
“statistical significance” as the relevant criterion. There are, however, alternative ways of
characterising substantial evidence, and this may also be done using Bayes factors.
I don’t have strong feelings on this issue. But one drawback to Bayes factors, given the
specific aims of ASPP, is that there is no universal norm in the scientific community as to what
the Bayes factor has to be before evidence is deemed substantial. I have come across the
proposal that a Bayes factor of at least 3 is necessary for substantial evidence (Jeffreys 1998;
Wagenmakers et al. 2011), but I’m not sure how strong a consensus there is on this point. By
contrast, there is a consensus norm in relation to frequentism: the (infamous) significance
level of 0.05.
This norm is controversial, and understandably so, but it remains a clear norm for the
time being, and a clear norm allows a clear rule for moving from evidence to policy. One
challenge for Bayesians is to show how the Bayes factor can take on the social and political
(as well as statistical) functions of the significance level: the functions of signalling to journals
that a result merits publication, and of signalling to policymakers that a result is substantial
and should not be ignored.
3. Is there really evidence of sentience in decapods?
Decapod crustaceans are a central case for ASPP, because there is ongoing disagreement as
to whether they should be brought within the scope of animal welfare law. This is exactly the
sort of problem ASPP is intended to help us with. If it does not help, then it is not delivering
what it is supposed to deliver.
Because of this, it is important for me to confront the sceptical arguments of Diggles
(2018), recently published in the ICES Journal of Marine Science. Diggles’s criticisms fall into
three categories: (i) doubts about whether there is any threat of serious negative welfare in
decapod aquaculture, even on the assumption that the animals are sentient; (ii) specific
concerns about the methodology of Elwood and colleagues’ experiments; and (iii) broader
concerns about allowing a precautionary principle to set the scope of animal welfare
protection. Let us consider each of these categories.
3.1 Serious risks to welfare
To motivate the first kind of doubt, Diggles discusses several controversial practices used in
decapod aquaculture for research purposes, including eyestalk ablation, and argues that
these practices do not create a risk of serious negative welfare. If this is right, then
precautionary reasoning does not apply, because there is no risk we need to take precautions
against.
Diggles’s case study pertains to aquaculture in a research facility, not in the context of
food production. Even if we grant that there is no serious threat to decapod welfare in
research facilities, there would still be very serious concerns about the way they are treated
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in the food industry and the culinary world, where practices such as live carving and live
boiling are common (see the commentaries by Elwood and Carder, as well as Elwood 2012;
Roth and Grismbø 2016; Birch 2017c).
But I do not think we should grant that there are no serious risks to welfare in research
facilities. Eyestalk ablation in particular deserves further scrutiny. As Diggles (2018)
describes:
"Eyestalk ablation is a process involving cauterizing or cutting of one of the eyestalks of a mature
(>10-month old) broodstock female prawn using flame-sterilized hot forceps or ligation in order
to alter the hormonal balance by reducing production of the inhibition hormones, allowing the
prawn to undergo the final stages of maturity in captivity." (p. 11)

The process is ubiquitous in prawn farming (recall that, in total, around 400 billion decapods
are farmed annually) and also in research aquaculture. Diggles notes that the process is
known to lead to physiological stress. He also notes evidence that decapods have heatresponsive nociceptors that would be activated by a prolonged exposure (>2 s) to the forceps,
but which might not be activated by a shorter exposure. His response is that the process is
normally rapid (<2 s) and that “while eyestalk ablation procedures lasting >2 s may induce
nociception (Puri and Faulkes 2015) and be stressful, nociception does not necessarily lead
to pain, and stress does not equal pain” (Diggles 2018, p. 11).
The problem is that, in the present context, it begs the question to appeal to the
absence of a necessary connection between nociception and pain (or, more generally,
aversive experiences), or between physiological stress and the subjective experience of
stress. At issue here is the question of whether there is a serious risk to welfare that might
justify precautionary measures in the absence of conclusive evidence of sentience. But all
Diggles does is point to the absence of conclusive evidence. He does not establish that there
is no serious risk to welfare. Indeed, everything he says about eyestalk ablation supports the
idea this practice does pose a serious risk: if nociceptive and stress responses are activated
in at least some cases, then there is a serious risk that an aversive experience is felt. We would
only be entitled to dismiss this possibility if we were entitled to dismiss the possibility of
decapod sentience, and we are not.
3.2 The methodology of electric shock experiments
The case for extending welfare protection to decapod crustaceans as a precautionary
measure rests heavily on experiments by Elwood and colleagues. In many of these
experiments, the noxious stimulus is an electric shock. Diggles questions whether electric
shocks can be shown to elicit a nociceptive response in crabs. Trade-off behaviour and
conditioned place avoidance show that the shock is eliciting a subtle and flexible response,
but they don’t show this response to be driven by nociceptive mechanisms:
“The main problem with electric shock, especially for aquatic animals, is that it non-specifically
activates any electrically excitable cell, including non-neural ones (e.g. muscle tissue), meaning
that assumed ‘nociceptive behaviours’ triggered by such stimuli may represent abnormal
responses of the nervous system (or other systems, see Derby and Steullet, 2001), rather than
reveal the workings of a nociceptive sensory system tuned to tissue damage by evolution (Puri
and Faulkes, 2015).” (Diggles 2018, pp. 4-5)
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As far as I know, it is correct that, while we have evidence of trade-off behaviour and separate
evidence of nociception in decapods, we don’t have evidence that the trade-off behaviour is
mediated by nociceptors. That said, this situation is not unique to decapods. It is common in
studies of human and non-human pain to use electric shocks as a negative stimulus without
specifically investigating whether the stimulus activates nociceptors. In other taxa, this is not
considered a reason to discount subsequent aversive behaviour as potentially indicative of
aversive conscious experience.
We should, of course, acknowledge that there is room for alternative explanations of
the observed trade-off behaviour. For example, in the Appel and Elwood study on hermit
crabs (Appel and Elwood 2009; Elwood and Appel 2009), it is possible that the shocks
delivered inside Gibbula shells were more powerful than those of the same voltage delivered
inside Littorina shells, coincidentally aligning with the shell preferences of the crabs. The
shells differ in shape, and it’s possible that the electrodes made closer contact with the crab
in the Gibbula shell. This possibility is noted by Magee and Elwood (2016), so they can hardly
be accused of dismissing alternative explanations.
The evidence here is not conclusive. No one should call this conclusive evidence of
pain experience, and Elwood does not do this. It’s appropriate that there should be robust
scientific debate about these experiments, along with attempts at replication and attempts to
gather more evidence. But, for the time being, we have to decide how to act on the information
that we do have. Should we, or should we not, take precautionary measures to safeguard the
welfare of these animals in the face of serious risks? My framework is an attempt to identify
the key questions we need to answer:
(1) Do the experiments in question meet normal scientific standards?
(2) Do they provide evidence of a credible indicator of sentience?

Regarding the first question, all sides should be able to agree that debate on this question is
important, and that there should be "no lowering of scientific standards with regard to the
design, methodology, and replication of experiments, or the analysis and interpretation of
data” (Diggles 2018, p. 13). But I see nothing to indicate that Elwood’s experiments involve
any lowering of scientific standards. They are sound experiments, even though the results are
not conclusive.
Regarding the second question, I can see that a sceptic might argue that trade-off
behaviour alone is not a credible indicator of sentience (in the narrow sense of subjective
experience with an attractive or aversive quality) unless the trade-off behaviour can be
shown to be mediated by nociceptive mechanisms. Showing that electric shocks do activate
nociceptors seems like an important and achievable objective for further work.
The question of what is, or is not, a credible indicator of sentience is one that the
animal sentience research community should decide collectively (Birch 2017a, p. 7). I hope
that the target article and accompanying commentaries have helped to crystallize the issues,
even though they do not resolve them. The important thing is that there should be a clear set
of goalposts that are not moved in an ad hoc way as evidence accumulates. If it is agreed by
the sceptics now that trade-off behaviour in response to stimuli independently shown to
activate nociceptors is a credible indicator of sentience, then it should be agreed now that if
electric shocks are shown to activate nociceptors, then this evidence plus the existing
behavioural evidence would provide evidence of a credible indicator. In short, I encourage
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Diggles and other sceptics to tell us now what they would accept as a credible indicator of
sentience.
If the answer is “yes” to questions (1) and (2), then we are justified in taking
appropriate precautionary measures, and we can move on to debating the most appropriate
measures to take. My proposed framework leaves plenty of options open, including the most
conservative option of commissioning further research into decapod sentience as a matter of
high funding priority, with a presumption in favour of protecting the order if no new evidence
comes to light (Birch 2017b, p. 15). It seems to me that, if nothing else, sceptics about decapod
sentience should at least be able to agree about the great importance of further research.
3.3 Broader concerns about a precautionary approach
Diggles raises some more general concerns that merit further discussion. One is that “if the
precautionary principle is enacted too early, a paradoxical ‘Catch-22’ situation may arise in
that restrictive animal ethics requirements may hinder or even prevent the high-quality
studies needed to provide the data to solve unresolved scientific questions” (p. 13). The
dilemma here is clear: more research into sentience in currently unprotected taxa is urgently
needed — but wouldn't the precautionary extension of animal welfare protection to these
taxa impede this research?
I suggest that bringing a taxon within the scope of animal welfare law is in fact likely
to stimulate more research into its welfare needs. The case of cephalopods is instructive here.
The inclusion of cephalopods within the scope of the 2010 EU directive on the protection of
animals used for scientific purposes has led to substantial interest in formulating detailed,
evidence-based guidelines for safeguarding their welfare, leading to proposals such as that of
Fiorito et al. (2015). It is true that new experiments aimed at understanding cephalopod
welfare will need ethics approval, which might be a disincentive, but I hope the incentives
created by the need for clear ethical guidelines outweigh that disincentive. There is a
feedback loop here — extending the scope of animal welfare regulation influences the
research that informs that regulation — but the feedback can be positive rather than
negative.
A second concern is that:
"If the precautionary principle is used to justify inclusion of certain animal groups under
welfare regulation, policymakers should be obliged to regularly review the scientific criteria
used to justify such decisions, and/or include provision for ‘sunset clauses’ for the withdrawal
of such taxa from protection if more robust scientific data becomes available at a later date
which invalidates the preliminary results used to trigger the precautionary decision.” (Diggles
2018, p. 13)

This suggestion is compatible with my proposals. Any precautionary measure should
be proportionate to the threat, in the sense of being sufficient to mitigate the identified risk
but not excessive (i.e., it should not do more than is necessary), and in the sense of being the
most cost-effective of the available sufficient but non-excessive measures. An extension to the
scope of animal welfare protection subject to renewal after a further review of the evidence
after a specified period would be in keeping with the idea of proportionality.
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